Between Ethics and Identity: A Comparative Analysis of Michel Foucault’s Individualist Ethics and Derek Parfit’s Anti-Identitarian Ethics

Foreword: The Paradox of Ethical Selfhood—Why Foucault and Parfit Need Each Other

What if the self is both the foundation and the illusion of ethics? Michel Foucault and Derek Parfit, two of the most radical thinkers of the last century, seem to stand on opposite shores—Foucault shaping an ethics of self-creation that demands agency and resistance, while Parfit dissolves the very notion of personal identity as an empty vessel, irrelevant to moral reasoning. But what if these positions are not enemies, but secret allies?

In an age where identity politics and moral responsibility collide with the philosophical deconstruction of the self, the unresolved tension between Foucault’s radical subjectivity and Parfit’s ethical impersonality offers more than just an abstract puzzle—it is the key to understanding the next frontier of moral philosophy. This paper argues that their contradictions are precisely what make a synthesis possible. By merging Foucault’s insistence on ethical self-fashioning with Parfit’s rejection of personal identity, we arrive at a new vision of ethical subjectivity—one that is neither bound by rigid identity nor lost in the void of impersonal calculus. The self is dead; long live the self.

Introduction

Michel Foucault and Derek Parfit occupy distinct yet intersecting domains in contemporary philosophy. While Foucault’s poststructuralist ethics emphasize self-fashioning, power relations, and the historical contingency of subjectivity (Stringer, 1990), Parfit’s metaphysical stance dismantles personal identity as a stable construct, arguing for an impersonal approach to moral responsibility and ethical decision-making (Schechtman, 2024). At first glance, Foucault’s insistence on self-creation appears to be at odds with Parfit’s dissolution of selfhood, yet their ethical projects share significant areas of convergence. This paper will explore their disagreements, points of overlap, and potential syntheses between their ethical frameworks.

Foucault’s Individualist Ethics: The Ethics of Self-Creation

Foucault’s later works articulate an ethics of self-fashioning, rooted in ancient Greek and Roman practices of care of the self (epimeleia heautou) and parrhesia (Alcoff, 2005). Ethics, for Foucault, is less about adhering to universal principles and more about engaging in a continuous process of subjectivation—wherein individuals construct themselves through aesthetic and ethical means (Marcus, 2018). This formulation is inherently anti-essentialist, viewing identity not as an intrinsic core but as historically contingent, socially constructed, and subject to power dynamics (Timcke, 2023).

However, Foucault does not completely abandon the self; instead, he reconstructs it as a site of resistance against dominant norms. This is particularly evident in his discussion of disciplinary power, where individuals navigate and redefine their subjectivities within the constraints of societal structures (Stringer, 1990). Foucault’s ethics thus retain an individuating impulse, urging individuals to craft their own values rather than conform to externally imposed moral frameworks.

Parfit’s Anti-Identitarian Ethics: The Non-Existence of the Self

Parfit’s metaphysical argument is grounded in a radical rejection of personal identity as a continuous, stable entity. In Reasons and Persons, he famously argues that what we call the “self” is merely a connected series of psychological states rather than a substantive metaphysical core (Sardo, 2017). He extends this idea into ethics, suggesting that moral obligations should not be tied to personal identity but to broader consequentialist considerations. This anti-identitarian stance posits that ethical decision-making should be impartial, guided by objective reasons rather than an individualist conception of the self (Cook, 2005).

A direct consequence of Parfit’s framework is the rejection of personal continuity as an ethically relevant category. Instead of prioritizing self-interest, moral agents should evaluate actions based on their aggregate effects on future psychological states and persons (Ó Fathaigh, 2020). In this way, Parfit’s ethics radically detach from Foucault’s emphasis on self-formation, replacing it with an impersonal moral calculus (Swan, 3221).

Points of Disagreement: Agency, Power, and Ethics

The most striking disagreement between Foucault and Parfit concerns the role of agency in ethical life. For Foucault, ethical agency is central to the project of self-creation; individuals must actively engage in practices of self-fashioning to resist oppressive structures (Alcoff, 2005). Parfit, by contrast, undermines the significance of agency by denying the necessity of a continuous self, shifting ethical focus toward the impersonal consequences of actions rather than individual self-formation (Swan, 3221).

Additionally, Foucault’s ethics are inherently political, dealing with the interplay of power and subject formation. He critiques the normative constraints that shape ethical possibilities, seeing the self as embedded within historical and social matrices of power (Stringer, 1990). Parfit, conversely, abstracts ethics from historical context, favoring a universalist and decontextualized approach that prioritizes future consequences over personal autonomy (Schechtman, 2024).

Overlapping Concerns: The Contingency of Identity and Ethics

Despite their fundamental disagreements, both Foucault and Parfit reject the idea of a stable, essential self. Foucault views identity as historically contingent and fluid, while Parfit denies its metaphysical necessity altogether. Both thinkers also emphasize a move away from traditional moral realism—Foucault through his genealogical critique of moral norms (Timcke, 2023), and Parfit through his consequentialist recalibration of ethical agency (Marcus, 2018).

Moreover, both thinkers challenge conventional moral obligations. Foucault’s ethics resist universal moral prescriptions, advocating for a more experimental and situated approach to ethics (Alcoff, 2005). Similarly, Parfit de-emphasizes personal identity in moral decision-making, pushing for a broader evaluative framework that transcends individualist concerns (Sardo, 2017).

Toward a Synthesis: Ethical Subjectivity Without Identity

A productive synthesis between Foucault and Parfit could emerge through a reconfigured ethics of subjectivity that retains Foucault’s emphasis on self-formation while integrating Parfit’s impersonalist ethical calculus. This synthesis would acknowledge the contingency of identity while preserving ethical agency within a framework that does not depend on personal continuity (Zurn, 1999). However, rather than seeing Foucault’s individualist ethics and Parfit’s anti-identitarian stance as irreconcilable, we can interpret them as complementary perspectives that inform a more nuanced understanding of ethical agency beyond the constraints of a metaphysical self.

One possible way to bridge their approaches is through the concept of relational selfhood, in which individuals engage in ethical self-creation while recognizing the fluid, discontinuous nature of identity. This synthesis does not necessitate the traditional view of a unified self but rather embraces a dynamic, evolving ethical subjectivity—an approach that aligns with Foucault’s notion of self-transformation while incorporating Parfit’s insights into the dispensability of identity in moral reasoning. The key to this synthesis is not to reject identity outright, as Parfit does, but to treat it as a contingent and instrumental construct, as Foucault suggests. This allows for ethical agency to persist without the metaphysical weight of a continuous personal identity.

Furthermore, Foucault’s ethics of self-creation can be expanded to accommodate Parfit’s broader consequentialist orientation. While Foucault prioritizes the ways in which individuals construct themselves through ethical practices, Parfit’s framework suggests that ethical decision-making should be guided by considerations that extend beyond the self. A synthesis of their views could take the form of an ethics of intersubjective transformation, in which individuals are encouraged to engage in self-fashioning while remaining attuned to the larger ethical implications of their actions. This perspective would align with Foucault’s call for creative self-stylization while ensuring that such self-construction does not devolve into an isolated, solipsistic endeavor. Instead, ethical self-formation would be framed as a relational and socially embedded practice, one that simultaneously recognizes the contingency of identity and the broader moral landscape in which individuals operate (Ó Fathaigh, 2020).

This synthesis also provides a way to navigate ethical responsibility in a world where identity is increasingly fluid and fragmented. Parfit’s anti-identitarian ethics, in undermining the necessity of personal continuity, presents an alternative to traditional notions of moral responsibility that rely on a stable, persisting self. However, one critique of Parfit’s view is that it risks detaching ethical agency from lived experience, making it overly abstract. A synthesis with Foucault’s ethics of self-transformation can help ground ethical decision-making in concrete practices of self-engagement and reflection while still incorporating Parfit’s insights about the impersonal nature of moral reasoning (Sardo, 2017).

Another significant area of synthesis concerns the politics of subjectivity. Foucault’s work highlights the ways in which identity is shaped by power relations, institutions, and social norms. Parfit, by contrast, largely abstracts ethical reasoning from historical and political contexts. However, integrating Parfit’s non-essentialist view of identity with Foucault’s analysis of power could result in an ethics that is both deeply engaged with the social world and unburdened by fixed notions of selfhood. In this synthesized framework, ethical agents would be encouraged to actively engage with and reshape the discursive structures that define subjectivity, while also adopting an ethical perspective that is not strictly tied to personal continuity or self-interest (Timcke, 2023).

Furthermore, this synthesis aligns with recent work in contemporary philosophy that seeks to reconcile poststructuralist ethics with moral responsibility. As theorists such as Alcoff (2005) have argued, the dissolution of a stable identity need not lead to ethical paralysis. Instead, it opens up new possibilities for context-dependent ethical engagement, where moral responsibility is framed as a dynamic interplay between personal self-formation and broader social and ethical considerations. This framework allows for the recognition that identity is always in flux, yet still enables individuals to engage in meaningful ethical reflection and decision-making (Marcus, 2018).

By integrating these perspectives, we can envision an ethical framework that is neither rigidly individualistic nor entirely impersonal. Rather than viewing identity as an obstacle to moral reasoning (as Parfit does) or as a site of creative resistance (as Foucault suggests), we can adopt an ethics of situated transformation, where individuals continuously negotiate and redefine their ethical commitments in response to evolving social and moral contexts. This approach accommodates Foucault’s emphasis on ethical self-creation while also incorporating Parfit’s argument that the continuity of personal identity is not a necessary condition for moral reasoning (Zurn, 1999).

Lastly, this synthesis has profound implications for contemporary ethical and political debates, particularly in discussions of identity politics, social justice, and the ethics of emerging technologies. If identity is neither an essential foundation for ethics nor entirely irrelevant, then moral reasoning must take into account both the ways in which individuals construct their selves and the broader ethical structures in which they participate. This perspective offers a way forward in debates about moral responsibility, autonomy, and ethical subjectivity in an era where traditional notions of identity are increasingly called into question (Swan, 3221).

In sum, by integrating Foucault’s ethics of self-creation with Parfit’s anti-identitarian moral philosophy, we can develop a more flexible and responsive ethical framework—one that acknowledges the contingency of identity while still preserving the agency necessary for ethical action. This synthesis does not resolve all tensions between their views, but it offers a compelling way to rethink ethical subjectivity in light of contemporary philosophical concerns.

Conclusion

Foucault and Parfit, despite their differing intellectual lineages, share a deep skepticism toward fixed identity as a foundation for ethics. Their disagreements revolve primarily around the role of agency and power, with Foucault prioritizing ethical self-creation and Parfit advocating for an impersonal moral framework. However, their shared rejection of essentialist identity provides fertile ground for a synthesis—one that embraces ethical subjectivity without the constraints of metaphysical selfhood. Such an approach could retain Foucault’s emphasis on historical situatedness while incorporating Parfit’s broader ethical perspective, leading to a renewed and dynamic vision of ethical life.